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Abstract
This study calibrates the term structure of risk premia before and during
the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis using a new calibration approach based on
credit default swaps. The risk premium term structure was ﬂat before
the crisis and downward sloping during the crisis. The instantaneous risk
premium increased signiﬁcantly during the crisis, whereas the long-run
mean of the risk premium process was of the same magnitude before and
during the crisis. These ﬁndings suggest that (marginal) investors have
become more risk averse during the crisis. Investors were, however, well
aware that risk premia will revert back to normal levels in the long run.
Keywords: credit risk, risk premia, equity premium, mean reversion, structural
models of default
JEL Classiﬁcation: G12, G135
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Non-technical summary:
Risk premia are an important determinant of asset prices and asset returns.
During the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis many market observers attributed the sig-
niﬁcant and world-wide decline in asset prices not only on fundametals but also
on an increase in the required compensation for risk. This ’gut-feeling’ raises two
important questions that this study tries to answer: First, are we able to measure
the alleged increase in risk premia based on a sound methodological framework?
Second, is this increase in risk premia a temporary increase or does it constitute
a permanent shift in investor’s behaviour?
The study uses credit default swaps (CDS) for several maturities (3-, 5-, 7-
and 10-year) to extract the risk premium term structure from market prices. The
underlying idea is quite simple: The CDS premium is split into an expected loss
component and into a risk premium component. The risk premium component
itself can be transformed into a widely used measure of risk aversion: the Sharpe
ratio. Based on more than 150,000 observations from April 2004 - March 2009
for Europe and the U.S. the study draws the following conclusions: First, short-
term risk premia have increased signiﬁcantly during the ﬁnancial crisis. Second,
long-term risk premia remained almost unchanged during the ﬁnancial crisis.
These results indicate that a signiﬁcant part of the world-wide decline in asset
prices is indeed attributable to an increase in risk premia. This increase does,
however, not constitute a structural and permanant shift in investor’s behaviour
but merely constitues a short-term decline in the demand for risky assets.6
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1 Introduction
Practitioners and academics usually claim that risk premia must have increased
signiﬁcantly during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis to justify the returns and valua-
tions seen in the market. This raises a set of questions: How can this ’gut feeling’
by market participants be scrutinized in a solid methodological framework? And:
Is the change in risk premia expected to be a permanent shift or do market par-
ticipants expect risk premia to revert back to normal levels once the crisis is
over? If risk premia are indeed volatile and mean reverting a risk premium term
structure emerges. E.g. during times when (marginal) investors demand above
average risk premia - such as gut feeling suggests for the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial cri-
sis - short duration assets would be expected to have a larger risk premium than
longer duration assets.
This paper analyzes the risk premium term structure before and during the
2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis and estimates the corresponding parameters of the in-
stantaneous risk premium process (long-run mean, mean reversion speed, volatil-
ity). Throughout this paper the risk premium is measured as the market Sharpe
ratio, i.e. the excess return of the market portfolio per unit of standard devia-
tion. Of course, a measure such as the equity premium could also be used. The
equity premium does, however, have the drawback that it combines risk aversion
(’Sharpe ratio’) and the quantity of risk (’volatility’). The target of this paper is
not to state that the quantity of risk has increased during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial
crisis. Instead, the focus is on the excess return per unit of risk measured via the
market Sharpe ratio.1
In a survey of Welch (2000), 20% of the participants oﬀered monotonically
increasing and 50% monotonically decreasing equity premium term structures.
While this may be a good indication of the survey participants perception in this
1One could therefore also more precisely refer to the term structure of risk aversion. Our
results do, however, hold for both the term structure of risk aversion as well as the term structure
of risk premia and we therefore prefer to refer to the latter.7
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speciﬁc year, reliance on surveys or expert estimates is not satisfactory from an
academic perspective.
Stongly time-varying risk premia are also part of pricing kernels that have
been suggested to solve the equity premium puzzle such as Campbell/Cochrane
(1999). This pricing kernel is also used by Chen et al. (2009) to analyze the
eﬀect on credit spreads. However, these studies only provide indirect evidence
for time-variation in risk premia, i.e. they provide indications that time-varying
Sharpe ratios can help to explain realized moments (averages, volatility) of his-
torical returns. In contrast, this paper tries to explicitly measure time-variation
in risk premia by analyzing risk premium term structures.
Unfortunately, risk premium processes are inherently hard to measure. One
part of the literature (e.g. Poterba/Summers (1988), Cambell/Viceira (1999)) has
tried to use historical returns to estimate mean reversion in stock prices. Based on
an AR(1)-speciﬁcation, Campbell/Viceira (1999) ﬁnd indeed that there is mean
reversion in historical equity returns. Their results are, however, only signiﬁcant
when looking at a time series of more than 100 years. Using shorter time horizons
does not yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients anymore. This is not surprising since there
are two layers of noise in this methodology: First, the equity premium process is
not deterministic insofar as it includes a stochastic error term. In addition, the
equity premium is not equal to the realized returns.
The return predictability literature has used the identity that dividend/price-
ratios (d/p-ratios) have to predict either dividend growth or future returns.2
Since d/p-ratios only weakly predict dividend growth this has been attributed to
changes in expected returns (see Fama/French (1988), Cochrane (1992)). D/p-
ratios are time-varying and mean-reverting, therefore the same should be true for
expected (excess) returns. Other authors have used term spreads, T-bill rates,
earnings and macro variables to predict excess returns (Fama/French (1989),
2Or price/dividend-ratios must be allowed to grow explosively (bubble).8
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Lamount (1998), Lettau/Ludvigson (2001)). However, these studies are only
able to ﬁnd indirect indications for time-varying expected returns. No direct link
has yet been established.
This paper takes a new approach and uses credit markets to identify time-
varying risk premia. This approach oﬀers two distinctive advantages: First, im-
plicit risk premia can be used instead of realized returns. We thereby make use
of a new approach proposed by Berg/Kaserer (2009) which allows to estimate
the Sharpe ratio of the underlying ﬁrm’s asset value process directly from CDS
spreads. Second, in contrast to equities, credit instruments are available for a va-
riety of distinct maturities. In particular for credit default swaps (CDS), standard
maturities (usually 3, 5, 7, 10 years) have been established. Therefore, Sharpe
ratios can be extracted from the credit markets for each maturity separately. This
in turn yields a term structure of Sharpe ratios. Based on a time series of Sharpe
ratio term structures the parameters of the instantaneous Sharpe ratio process
can be estimated with a very high accuracy.3 Indeed, the methodology proposed
in this paper results in reliable estimations for the parameters of the Sharpe ratio
process with sample periods as small as 12 months.
This study uses more than 150,000 CDS spreads from the constituents of the
main CDS indices in Europe (iTraxx Europe) and the U.S. (CDX.NA.IG) from
April 2004 - March 2009. The resulting term structure of risk premia has been ﬂat
before the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis and downward sloping during the 2007/2008
ﬁnancial crisis. Calibrating these results to a CIR process for the instantaneous
Sharpe ratio shows that the long-run mean is of the same magnitude before and
during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, the instantaneous Sharpe ratio
has increased signiﬁcantly during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
3It is well known from the interest rate literature that adding cross sections (i.e. diﬀerent
maturities) greatly enhances the estimation accuracy for the underlying process. Especially in
situations where short-term interest rates are far above or below the long-run mean, adding
information from further maturities signiﬁcantly decreases the resulting standard errors for the
estimation of the long-run mean and mean-reversion speed.9
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These results convey the idea that (marginal) investors have become more risk
averse during the crisis. Investors were, however, well aware that risk premia will
revert back to normal levels again. As a result short-term risk premia increased
more than long-term risk premia. The slope of the risk premium term structure
(measured as 10-yr Sharpe ratio minus 3-year Sharpe ratio) has been approxi-
mately zero before the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis and has become negative during
the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
A higher risk aversion during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis seems to be very
reasonable given the excessive fear of market participants about what is going
on in the markets. Indeed, we do not see this result in itself as a breakthrough.
Rather, the methodology used is - to our best knowledge - the ﬁrst one that is
able to extract this kind of risk premium term structure out of current market
prices. The scope of the methodology is not limited to the pure measurement of
time-varying risk premia but could also be fruitful in areas such as return pre-
dictability, tactical asset allocation and company valuation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 describes our data sources. Section 4 provides the empirical
results for the estimation of the term structure of Sharpe ratios and the param-
eters of the instantaneous Sharpe ratio process. Robustness tests are shown in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model setup
This section ﬁrst links asset valuation to debt valuation (subsection 2.1) and
then introduces a process for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio (subsection 2.2)
in order to derive an estimator for the Sharpe ratio term structure (subsection
2.3) (based on Berg/Kaserer (2009)) and for the parameters of the Sharpe ratio
process (subsection 2.4) (based on a Kalman Filter approach).10
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2.1 Asset value process and default mechanism
The basic idea is to use structural models of default to link credit to equity
valuations. This approach goes back to Merton (1974) and has already been used
in Berg/Kaserer (2009) to estimate Sharpe ratios and equity premia from CDS
spreads. The following two input factors have to be speciﬁed:
• The dynamics of the asset value process (including the dynamics of the
asset Sharpe ratio).
• The default mechanism which - in addition to the asset value process -
determines the default time.
Asset value process: The real world asset value process Vt is modeled as a
diﬀusion with a risk-free rate r, a payout ratio δ, a mean-reverting market Sharpe
ratio θV
t and an asset volatility σV.
Asset value process : dVt =( θ
V
t · σ





CAPM condition : θV
t = ρtθt, with ρt = Corr(rM,t,r V,t) (2)





Equation (2) assumes that the continuous time CAPM holds, i.e. that the com-
pany Sharpe ratio (θV) is the product of the asset/market-correlation (ρ) and
the market Sharpe ratio (θ). Here, rM,t and rV,t denote the stochastic variables
for the return on the market portfolio and the asset return. The last equation
formulates the process for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio. This process will be
speciﬁed in more detail in section 2.2.
The formulas above can be easily reformulated in terms of the equity premium
πt instead of the market Sharpe ratio θt. The Sharpe ratio was chosen because it
is a purer measure of risk aversion (whereas the equity premium measures both
risk aversion as well as the quantity of risk).11
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Default mechanism: A simple Merton model is assumed, i.e. default can
only happen at the end of maturity if the asset value is lower than the default
barrier. Therefore, the actual (PDP) and risk-neutral (PDQ) default probability








T <L ] (5)
The choice of such a speciﬁc default mechanism may seem to be a rather hard
restriction. Fortunately, our results are robust with respect to the use of other
models, e.g. ﬁrst-passage time mechanism or strategic default models. This issue
will be discussed in more detail in subsection 2.3.
2.2 A process for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio
The instantaneous Sharpe ratio θt is modeled as a mean-reverting CIR process,
i.e.






The expectation of θs can be determined as
E[θs]=θ(t)e





and therefore the real-world average of the Sharpe ratios between s and t equals
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Please note that we have deﬁned the average Sharpe ratio Θ(t,τ) as a real world
arithmetic average rather than a risk-neutral average of the respective discount12
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rates.4 The reason behind that deﬁnition will become clearer in the next subsec-
tions.
The choice of a speciﬁc process for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio process is by
no means trivial. Several other candidates (e.g. Vasicek-process) would certainly
also qualify. The CIR process was chosen for several reasons: First, it is able
to capture mean reversion and volatility. Second, its parameters can be easily
interpreted (¯ θ : long-run mean, κ: mean reversion speed, σ: volatility). Third, it
is analytically tractable. Fourth, its volatility is dependent on the current state
of the process which best suits the real-world data, cf. section 4.
There are several possible underlying reasons why Sharpe ratios may be time-
varying. One reason may be a time-varying risk aversion of the marginal investor.
But even under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion time-varying
expected returns may emerge if the volatility of consumption is time-varying. This
paper does not aim to explain the drivers of time-varying expected returns, rather
it takes the indications of several academic studies (see Fama/French (1988) and
Cochrance (1992) for an overview) to analyze if expected time-varying Sharpe
ratios can be validated based on current asset prices.
2.3 Estimating Sharpe ratios from CDS spreads
This subsection derives a formula to estimate both the Sharpe ratio of the un-
derlying ﬁrm’s asset value process and the market Sharpe ratio directly from
CDS spreads and estimates for the real world default probability. Similar to
Berg/Kaserer (2009) the following estimator for the market Sharpe ratio SRM









   t+τ
t θ(s)ds
 







5The Sharpe ratio of the underlying ﬁrm’s asset value process can be estimated by omitting
the ρV,M-term.13
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where PDQ and PDP denote the cumulative risk-neutral and actual default prob-
ability, τ denotes the maturity and and ρV,M denotes the asset/market correlation.
Details are provided in appendix B.
Although this estimator is derived in a simple Merton framework, Berg/Kaserer
(2009) have shown that the estimator is still robust in ﬁrst-passage-time frame-
works, strategic default frameworks and frameworks with unobservable asset val-
ues (Duﬃe/Lando (2001) model). Huang/Huang (2003) also show that - given
a certain actual default probability - the risk-neutral default probability is al-
most the same for the main structural models of default in the literature. They
analyze the Longstoﬀ/Schwartz (1995) model with stochastic interest rates, the
Leland/Toft (1996) model with endogeneous default, strategic default models of
Anderson/Sundaresan/Tychon (1996) and Mella-Barral/Perraudin (1997) and a
model with mean-reverting leverage ratios. Their analysis also includes a model
with time-varying asset risk premium.
Appendix A shows that the Sharpe ratio estimator above is approximately
true for a model with time-varying Sharpe ratios if the constant Sharpe ratio








The cumulative risk-neutral default probability PDQ can be dervied from




where LGD denotes the loss given default. The respective calibration issues are
discussed in the empirical part.14
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2.4 Estimation of the parameters of the instantaneous
Sharpe ratio process
Unfortunately, the Sharpe ratio process θt can not be observed directly. Instead,
only the average expected Sharpe ratios Θ(ti,τ j) can be measured via (11) and
this measurement may be subject to noise. Therefore, the Kalman ﬁlter method-
ology is needed in order to estimate the parameters of the Sharpe ratio process.
The application of this methodology is similar - but not equal - to the literature
on interest rate processes.6 In our case, the transition and measurement equations
can be derived based on equation (6) and (9), i.e.
θti = Fθ ti−1 + C +  ti (13)


















 ti ∼ noncentralχ




























where τ denotes a vector of all available maturities. R is unknown and estimated
within the Kalman ﬁlter methodology. The error term  ti has a non-central χ2
distribution. We will approxmiate this by a normal distribution, cf. Bolder
6Cf. Bolder (2001) for a good overview about the Kalman ﬁlter approach and interest rate
modeling.15
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Here, Θ(ti) denotes a row vector where each row represents one maturity. The
conditional expectations and variances are determined based on (14).
The parameter estimation proceeds in two steps:
• First, the Sharpe ratios Θ(ti,τ j) are estimated based on (11) for all available
maturities τj and for all available dates ti.
• Second, the parameters of the Sharpe ratio process are estimated based on
(13)-(15).
3 Data sources and descriptive statistics
The sample consists of weekly observations of 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year CDS spreads
from on-the-run companies of the main CDS indices in Europe and the U.S. from
April 2004 until March 2009. The iTraxx Europe index was used for Europe and
CDX.NA.IG index was used for the U.S. Both indices consist of 125 members
and are rolled over every six month (end of March and end of September). The
ﬁrst series of the iTraxx was launched on Mar, 20th, 2004, the ﬁrst series of the
CDX.NA.IG was launched on Nov, 20th, 2003. In order to obtain the same sam-
ple period for both Europe and the U.S. our sample starts for both regions in
April 2004.
For each observation, the average market Sharpe ratio was estimated based
on (11). The following input parameters were needed: a) CDS spreads and b)
loss given default (to estimate the risk-neutral default probability based on (12)),16
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c) real world cumulative default probabilities and d) correlation between asset
returns and market returns.
The CDS spreads for 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year maturity were taken from CMA
(Credit Markets Association) via Datastream. Mid spreads were used for the
analysis. Together with each CDS spread CMA provides a veracity score which
indicates if the spread is based on an actual trade, a ﬁrm bid or other sources
(e.g. indicative bid, bond spread derived). A date/company-combination was
only included in our sample if either trades or ﬁrm bids have been reported for
all maturities (3,-5-,7-, 10-year) in that respective week. The loss given default
The actual cumulative default probability was determined based on expected
default frequencies (EDFs) from Moody’s KMV. Moody’s KMV provides EDFs
from 1- to 10-year maturities based on the distance-to-default measure. To cal-
ibrate the distance-to-default to default probabilities KMV uses its proprietary
database of historical default events. Therefore, there is no problem of any circu-
lar arguments, since the level of default probabilities does not rely on any Sharpe
ratio or drift assumptions taken by Moody’s KMV. Robustness tests based on a
hybrid hazard-rate model have been conducted.
Correlations between asset returns and the market return were proxied by
the rolling 2-year median industry correlation between the corresponing equity
returns and the market return.7 The data was taken from Datastream. Using
equity instead of asset correlations is justiﬁed as equity is a deep-in-the-money
call on the company’s assets. Therefore, delta is approximately one and gamma
7Median industry correlations were taken for robustness reasons. Since the correlation enters
our formula in the denominator, estimation errors result in an upward biased estimator for
the market Sharpe ratio. Industry medians have lower standard errors than a company-by-
At each date, we estimated the 2-year weekly correlation between the performance index of the
respective stocks in each industry and the major index in each region (Europe: Stoxx600, U.S.:
S&P 500).
was set to 60% based on Moody’s (2007) and robustness tests were performed.
company estimation and also allow to include companies without a 2-year equity price history.17
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approximately zero and correlations are (almost) the same.
Finally, the sample period was split into two sub-periods: ’Before Crisis’ (April
2004-June 2007) and ’During Crisis’ (July 2007-March 2009). Of course there is
no single starting date of the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis8, therefore our division
of the sample period is - to a certain extent - arbitrary.9 Already in Feb. 2007,
HSBC announced losses of $ 10bn related to subprime mortgages. In April 2007,
New Century Financial, one of the biggest mortgage lenders in the U.S. declared
bankruptcy. The crisis accelerated in June and July 2007 when Bear Stearns
had to inject $ 3.2 bn to bail out two of its hedge fonds and when Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s downgraded more than 250 subprime RMBS. The Dow Jones
index peaked as late as in October 2007. However, our main conclusions do also
hold when choosing Q2 2007 or Q4 2007 as a starting point for the 2007/2008
ﬁnancial crisis. It is not the target to show that certain risk premia changes hap-
pened exactly at the beginning of the crisis. Rather it should be demonstrated
that the implied risk premia have gradually changed throughout the turmoil.
All in all, the study uses 23,532 observations for each maturity for Europe
(15,103 before the crisis, 8,429 observations during the crisis) and 22,819 obser-
vations for each maturity for the U.S. (14,416 before, 8,403 during the crisis).
The descriptive statistics for the input parameters are shown in table 1.
8Although our data sample ends in March 2009 and the ’During Crisis’ subperiod spans
from July 2007 until March 2009, we will still use the term ’2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis’ as the
years 2007 and 2008 are most closely related to the ﬁnancial crisis.
9The following information on the history of the ﬁnancial crisis was
taken from CNNMoney.com/Special report: Subprime crisis: A timeline
(http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/economy/subprime timeline/index.htm).18
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Table 1:
Descriptive statistics for input parameters
The sample consists of the intersection of the KMV database, the iTraxx on-the-run companies
(Europe)/ CDX.NA.IG on-the-run companies (U.S.) and the CMA CDS database (via Datas-
tream) from April 2004 to March 2009. CDS3/CDS5/CDS7/CDS10 denote 3-/5-/7-/10-year
CDS spreads in bp. EDF3/EDF5/EDF/7/EDF10 denote 3-/5-/7-/10-year cumulative ex-
pected default frequencies from Moodys KMV. ρ denotes the equity/market correlation. Median
industry correlations have been used based on rolling 2-year weekly returns. The corresponding
market returns are based on the return index of the Stoxx600 (Europe) and S&P 500 (U.S.).
σM denotes the implied market volatility based on maturities from 18-23 months from the VIX
term structure (mid prices) of the VStoxx sub-index and the CBOE. Averages are calculated
as unweighted averages over all observations.
Before Subprime (04/2004 - 06/2007) During Subprime (07/2006 - 03/2009)
Param. N Mean Median Stddev N Mean Median Stddev
Panel A: Europe
CDS3 15,103 20.84 17.30 15.85 8,429 112.52 70.70 149.57
CDS5 15,103 34.31 29.20 23.84 8,429 123.62 84.70 137.91
CDS7 15,103 44.13 39.00 28.09 8,429 126.49 89.40 129.19
CDS10 15,103 54.39 49.30 31.96 8,429 129.06 93.40 122.74
EDF3 15,103 0.56% 0.36% 0.61% 8,429 0.81% 0.30% 2.17%
EDF5 15,103 1.35% 0.90% 1.32% 8,429 1.77% 0.80% 3.38%
EDF7 15,103 2.22% 1.53% 2.04% 8,429 2.80% 1.39% 4.56%
EDF10 15,103 3.49% 2.37% 3.09% 8,429 4.29% 2.28% 6.22%
ρ 15,103 0.57 0.58 0.11 8,429 0.60 0.57 0.10
σM 15,103 19.57% 18.92% 2.09% 8,429 28.68% 25.53% 6.97%
Panel B: US
CDS3 14,416 32.38 20.00 52.08 8,403 185.69 72.60 354.24
CDS5 14,416 53.74 37.70 62.69 8,403 187.95 88.70 306.61
CDS7 14,416 66.86 49.20 66.53 8,403 182.80 93.80 273.51
CDS10 14,416 79.74 60.70 69.61 8,403 180.40 100.00 247.81
EDF3 14,416 0.54% 0.30% 1.23% 8,403 2.21% 0.30% 6.96%
EDF5 14,416 1.21% 0.70% 1.98% 8,403 3.68% 0.75% 9.21%
EDF7 14,416 1.94% 1.18% 2.70% 8,403 5.08% 1.25% 11.02%
EDF10 14,416 3.01% 1.98% 3.75% 8,403 7.02% 2.08% 13.33%
ρ 14,416 0.51 0.52 0.08 8,403 0.55 0.56 0.08
σM 14,416 16.08% 15.92% 1.43% 8,403 28.20% 24.89% 7.84%19
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4 Results
4.1 Risk premium term structure
The Sharpe ratio estimates based on 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year CDS spreads are shown
in ﬁgure 1 (Europe) and ﬁgure 2 (U.S.).10 Both Europe and the U.S. show a very
similar pattern of CDS-implied Sharpe ratios over the whole sample period. In
addition, for both Europe and the U.S. CDS-implied Sharpe ratios before the
2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis are very similar for all maturities. In fact, the implied
Sharpe ratio estimates for diﬀerent maturities rarely deviate by more than ﬁve
percentage points before the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The overall level of the
Sharpe ratio estimates is slightly higher for the U.S. (predominantly between 20-
50% before the crisis) than for Europe (predominantly between 10-40% before the
crisis) as also mentioned in Berg/Kaserer (2009). This is consistent with both
historical experience as well as with standard portfolio theory.11
The time series of CDS-implied Sharpe ratios shows two signiﬁcant changes:
The ﬁrst occurs around April 2005, when CDS-implied Sharpe ratios increase by
approximately 20PP (from 20% to 40% for Europe and from 30% to 50% for the
U.S.). This is likely to be due to the downgrades of Ford and General Motors
which resulted in an overall repricing in the CDS markets.12 However, it can
be observed, that CDS-implied Sharpe ratios increase for all maturities simulta-
neouly and by the same amount. Therefore, both before and after April 2005,
3-/5-/7- and 10-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratios are almost the same for a given
10Median Sharpe ratios for each date are depicted to decrease the inﬂuence of outliers. Mean
estimates are, however, very similar but sligtly higher. Detailled results and descriptive statistics
can be found in appendix B and an in-depth discussion and comparison with other Sharpe ratio
and equity premium estimates can be found in Berg/Kaserer (2009).
11Under the assumption that the U.S. market has a higher correlation with the global market
portfolio than the European market, the European Sharpe ratios are smaller than U.S. Sharpe
ratios based on CAPM considerations.
12Ford and General Motors were downgraded to junk status on May, 5th, 2005 by S&P but
this is likely to have been anticipated beforehand in the bond and CDS markets due to a negative
outlook status. E.g. Hull et al. (2004) ﬁnd that spread changes lead rating announcements by
up to 90 days.20
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date.
The second signiﬁcant change occurs at the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis
in July 2007. The change diﬀers, however, signiﬁcantly from the one observed in
April 2005: For both Europe as well as the U.S. implied Sharpe ratios generally
increase during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The increase is, however, much
more pronounced for short-term maturities (3-year, 5-year) than for longer ma-
turities (7-year, 10-year). As a result, the term structure of risk premia changes
from a ﬂat term structure before the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis to an inverse term
structure during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. This term structure of Sharpe ra-
tios is depicted in ﬁgure 3. In addition, the behaviour of the risk premium term
structure (ﬂat before the crisis and inverse during the crisis) is very persistent as
can be seen from ﬁgure 1 (Europe) and ﬁgure 2 (U.S.). Indeed, the inverse nature
of the risk premium term structure was prevalent in any week without exception
from mid 2007 until the end of our sample period.
The economic interpretation is straightforward: Assume that the risk aversion
of the marginal investors is mean-reverting. Then the instantaneous Sharpe ratio
will also be mean-reverting. If the instantaneous Sharpe ratio equals the long-run
mean, a ﬂat risk premium term structure will be observed. In contrast, if the
current instantaneous Sharpe ratio is high, the expected Sharpe ratio will be a
decreasing function of the maturity. Therefore, an inverse risk premium term
structure emerges.
Figure 4 shows the slope of the risk premium term structure - deﬁned as the
10-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio minus the 3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio.
Similar to the interest rate literature, this slope determines the diﬀerence between
long-run and short run risk premia. The resulting slope is close to zero before
the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Then, it drops signiﬁcantly at the end of the
second quarter of 2007 with local minima around March/April 2008 (after the
Bear Stearns rescue) and October/November 2008 (after the Lehman default). It21
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Figure 1: CDS-implied Sharpe ratio for Europe (index: iTraxx Europe) based on
3-/5-/7- and 10-year CDS spreads and EDFs form 04/2004-03/2009.
stays negative until the end of our sample period (March 2009).
4.2 Instantaneous Sharpe ratio process
Based on the estimates of the Sharpe ratio term structure from subsection 4.1
the parameters for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio process have been estimated as
described in subsection 2.4. The resulting parameter estimates for the long-run
mean Sharpe ratio ¯ θ, the mean reversion speed κ and the Sharpe ratio volatility σθ
are shown for both Europe and the U.S. in table 2. The Kalman methodology has
been applied for the total sample period (April 2004-March 2009) as well as for
the periods ’Before Crisis’ (April 2004-June 2007) and ’During Crisis’ (July 2007-
March 2009). Based on the observations from the last subsection, we also split
the results for the ’Before Crisis’ period into two subperiods (’Before GM/Ford’
denoting the period from April 2004 - March 2005 and ’After GM/Ford’ denoting
the period from April 2005-June 2007). In addition to the parameter estimates,22
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Figure 2: CDS-implied Sharpe ratio for the U.S. (index: CDX.NA.IG) based on
3-/5-/7- and 10-year CDS spreads and EDFs form 04/2004-03/2009.
the average of the (ﬁltered) instantaneous Sharpe ratio ( θt) is also depicted in
the second column of table 2.
For Europe, table 2 reveals that the long-run mean estimate (¯ θ) based on the
’During Crisis’ subperiod is larger than in the ’Before Crisis’ subperiod (42.0% vs.
30.0% with standard errors of 1.0% and 2.0%). However, if the period before the
GM and Ford downgrades is excluded, long-run mean estimates are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent at a 5% level before and during the crisis (42.0% vs. 37.9% with
standard errors of 1.0% and 1.9%). In contrast to the long-run mean estimates,
the estimates for the instantaneous Sharpe ratio (θt) are an order of magnitude
higher for the ’During Crisis’ subperiod than for the ’Before Crisis’ subperiod
(186.7% vs. 40.0%). I.e., while long-run means have not signiﬁcantly changed
during the ﬁnancial crisis, short-term risk premia have increased signiﬁcantly.
The results for the U.S. mainly support the evidence from the European sample
with both long-run means and instantaneous Sharpe ratios in a similar order of23
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Figure 3: Term structure of risk premia before (04/2004-06/2007) and during
(07/2007-03/2009) the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis for Europe (index: iTraxx Eu-
rope) and the U.S. (index: CDX.NA.IG). x-axis: maturity, y-axis: CDS-implied
market Sharpe ratio based on (11).
magnitude as for Europe.
A special attention should be devoted to the standard errors. All standard
errors are rather small. These small standard errors seem to be especially sur-
prising for the ’During Crisis’ period - where parameter estimates are only based
on 91 weekly observation. There are two (interlinked) reasons: First, this study
uses cross-sectional information, e.g. maturities of 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-years. This
cross-sectional information is very stable during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis:
The risk premium curve is inverse for every single week from mid 2007 on and
the slope of the risk premium term structure is similar during the whole ’During
Crisis’ subperiod. Second, it is a well known fact from interest rate modeling
that, if information for several maturities is available, long-run means and mean
reversion parameters can be estimated with higher accuracy when instantaneous
rates are far above or below their long-run mean parameters. Indeed, if the pa-
rameters are estimated only based on one of the maturities, standard errors are24
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Figure 4: Slope of risk premium term structure measured as 10-year CDS-implied
Sharpe ratio minus 3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio. Picture on left-hand side:
Europe, picture on right-hand side: U.S.
signiﬁcantly higher.
In particular the fact that the long-run mean is of a similar magnitude be-
fore and during the crisis seems to be an intuitive, but interesting ﬁnding. This
ﬁnding probably does not come as a surprise to most researchers. However, this
methodology is - to our best knowledge - the ﬁrst one that is able to extract these
risk premium term structures together with estimates for the Sharpe ratio process
out of current asset prices with a satisfying accuracy. The main advantage of this
approach is the feature, that it is able to estimate a whole term structure of risk
premia for each date in our sample. Adding this cross-sectional information in
addition to the pure time series evolvement of the implied or realized risk premia
renders the estimates much more precise.
It should be noted, however, that the estimates for the mean-reversion speed
and the volatility of the Sharpe ratio process show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween the pre-crisis and crisis period and that the standard errors around the
mean are in some cases economically signiﬁcant. However, a fair judgement of
this approach and the results presented in this paper can only be compared rela-25
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tive to the performance of alternative approaches. As indicated in the introduc-
tion, the risk premium process is inherently hard to measure. Campbell/Viceira
(1999) use historical U.S. equity returns of more than 100 years (1890-1993) to
estimate a process for the equity premium. They derive an average of 4.165%
with a standard error of 1.3% (approximately 30% of the mean) and a mean-
reversion parameter of 0.202 with a standard error of 0.062 (approximately 30%
of the mean). Using shorter time periods, Campbell/Viceira are not able to de-
rive statistically signiﬁcant results anymore. Given the results from theoretical
research (cf. Poterba/Summers (1988) and Cochrane (2005)) and the fact that
Campbell/Viceira use realized equity returns, this should not be surprising. In
contrast, our results for the U.S. based on only 5 years of observation (April
2004 - March 2009) have a standard error of 1.1% compared to a mean of 34.4%
(approximately 3% of the mean) for the long-run mean estimate and a standard
error of 0.8% compared to a mean of 13.5% (approxmiately 6% of the mean) for
the mean-reversion estimate. Therefore - despite the drawback described above
- we see the results and their accuracy as a step forward in the estimation of the
term structure of risk aversion.
5 Robustness tests
5.1 General remarks on robustness
The question of robustness arises for almost every empirical study. In the context
of the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis it does, however, gain special importance. Many
economic parameters have seen extraordinary levels during the 2007/2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis and may possibly distort our results. This may include the inﬂuence of
certain subsamples, subperiods or a bias in the measurement of any of the input
parameters.
Looking at certain subsamples - especially exclusion of ﬁnancials - or certain
subperiods during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis does not change the main result of
a downward sloping risk premium term structure during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial26
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crisis.13 The sensitivity with respect to the input parameters is analyzed in
the next step. First, a simple target value search is conducted. This target
value search looks at each paramater separately and determines the value of this
parameter as to yield a ﬂat risk premium term structure during the crisis. Of
course, this procedure is not able to gauge erros in several input parameters
at the same time. In addition, it is not able to explain why any of the input
parameters may have been biased during the crisis. Therefore, in a second step,
a diﬀerent proxy for the most crucial input parameter - the real world default
probability - is used. In addition, this study controls for parameters which have
seen extraordinary levels during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis via a regression
approach. As a ﬁnal check, market microstructure eﬀects on CDS liquidity are
analyzed.
5.2 Target search procedure
The target search proceeds in two steps. First, any of the input parameters (e.g.
the default probability) is chosen. Second, the value for this parameter which
would yield a ﬂat risk premium term structure for the ’During Crisis’ subperiod
(i.e. which yields the same 3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio than the 10-year
CDS-implied Sharpe ratio) is implicitly determined. This study takes a very con-
servative position: It is assumed, that the parameter for the 10-year calculations
remain unchanged while only the input parameters for the 3-year calculations
are changed. E.g., the 3-year PD-estimates are increased until the same Sharpe
ratio than with the original 10-year PD-estimates is obtained. Of course, if 3-
year PD-estimates are downward biased one would expect the same for 10-year
PD estimates. Therefore, the results provide a lower level of the change that is
necessary to yield a ﬂat term structure.
Table 3 depicts the value of the target search. The ’During Crisis’ period is
13It should be noted that ﬁnancials have a lower average CDS-implied market Sharpe ratio
than non-ﬁnancials. The slope of the risk premium term structure is, however, almost the same
for ﬁnancials and non-ﬁnancials. Detailed results are available in appendix B.28
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split into three subperiods to give a more detailed picture of the results. In the
following, we will focus on the average values for the ’During Subprime’ period.
The resulting values for the LGD are larger than 100% and therefore economi-
cally impossible for both Europe and the U.S. A correlation of 0.99 (Europe) and
0.88 (U.S.) also seems unrealistic, the values for some of the subperiod are even
larger than one and therefore statistically impossible. A 58% (Europe) / 53%
(U.S.) lower CDS spread is more than 10 times the bid/ask spread and cannot be
explained by market microstructure issues alone. The 3-year EDF would have to
be at least 178% (Europe) and 134% (U.S.) higher than it actually was to yield
a ﬂat term structure of risk premia during the crisis. For some subperiods in
Europe it would have to increase by even more than 200%. The resulting PDs
are 2.26% for Europe and 5.19% for the U.S. with the highest values in the post
Lehman period of more than 6% (Europe) and 10% (U.S.) respectively. Please
note that our sample consists only of investment grade obligors since the CDS
indices used include only investment grade obligors. The maximum 3-year cumu-
lative PD for investment grade obligors from 1970-2006 based on Moody’s (2007)
was 1.22%.14 The maximum 1-year default probability for the investment grade
obligors in the U.S. from 1920-2007 was 1.557% (in 1938). It would need more
than three years in a row as bad as the worst year from 1920-2007 to yield a
year from 1920-2007 to yield a cumulative PD of more than 10%. These values
seem to be unreasonable given historical experience
However, the PD estimate is probably the single most crucial input parameter
of our procedure. Therefore we will perform two other robustness tests: First, an
alternative measures for the PD estimate is applied, then a robustness test based
on a linear regression of CDS spreads on certain parameters with very high/low
levels during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis is performed.
14Cf. Moody’s (2007), Exhibit 33. The study is a worldwide study but is dominated by U.S.
and European data. The average default rate for Europe is usually lower than for the U.S.,
although Moody’s does not provide a disaggregation on this level.
cumulative PD as high as 5.19 % or even three years twice as bad as the worst29
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5.3 Diﬀerent PD estimates
PD estimates can be categorized into three approaches: Agencies ratings (Moody’s,
Fitch, S&P), estimates derived from structural models of default (such as KMV
EDFs) and hazard rate models. Agencies ratings are (partly) expert-based and
are ’through-the-cycle’ ratings, therefore they are not suited for this study. Haz-
ard rate models similar to Shumway (2001) are especially popular for internal
rating models of major banks. Recently, Fitch also launched its new equity-
distance-to-default-measure as one of the covariates. In addition, ﬁnancial ratios,
market performance and macro variables are used for default prediction.15
The resulting term structure of risk premia using Fitch EIR as a proxy for
the real world default probability is shown in ﬁgure 5 together with the estimates
based on Moody’s KMV for the same sample.16 Financials had to be excluded
as they are not covered by Fitch EIR. In addition, estimates for the cumulative
default probability are only available for up to 5 years maturity. Therefore the
term structure of risk premia was calculated as (5-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio)
minus (3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio). Figure 5 shows a very similar pattern
for estimates based on either Moody’s KMV or Fitch EIR. Indeed, the correlation
coeﬃcient between the two slopes are between 0.8 and 0.9. In both cases, the slope
of the term structure is positive directly before the ﬁnanical crisis (ﬁrst half of
2007) and becomes negative during the ﬁnancial crisis. Our results are therefore
not due to the speciﬁc distance-to-default-based speciﬁcation of Moody’s KMV
but also holds if a larger amount of covariates is included for default prediction.
5.4 Regression analysis
The following regression controls for the inﬂuence of several ﬁnancial parameters
that have seen extraordinary levels during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. These
15For details see FitchRatings (2007).
16Fitch EIRs were only available to us until October 2008, therefore ﬁgure 5 only shows the
comparison between the two estimates from April 2004 until October 2008.
implied ratings (EIR). Fitch uses a hazard rate approach but also includes the31
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Figure 5: Slope of risk premium term structure measured as 5-year CDS-implied
Sharpe ratio minus 3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio. Picture on left-hand side:
U.S., picture on right-hand side: Europe. Solid line: Estimate based on Moody’s
KMV EDFs as a proxy for the real world default probability, dotted line: Fitch
EIR as a proxy for the real world default probability.
parameters may eﬀect any of our input parameters, especially the estimate for
the real world default probability. We control for the eﬀect of the following
parameters:
• Implied Volatility (IV): Volatility may not be captured correctly in the
KMV EDF estimates since these are based on historical volatilities. Implied
volatility is measured based on short-term at-the-money option prices from
Bloomberg.
• Skewness (SKEW): KMV uses a volatility-based measure in their distance-
to-default. A low skewness might therefore underestimate the default prob-
ability.17 Skewness is measured as the 180-days historical return skewness
based on Datastream return data.18
• Information uncertainty (UNCERT): Based on Duﬃe/Lando (2001), higher
17Cf. Colin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for similar considerations. Colin-Dufresne (2001) use
changes in the slope of the smirk of implied volatilities to control for jump magnitudes.
18We also applied two other measures of skewness: option-implid skewness and skewness
implied from I/B/E/S forecast. The results did not signiﬁcantly change.32
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information uncertainty leads to higher (short-term) default probabilities.
Information uncertainty may have been larger during the 2007/2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis, therefore leading to an underestimation of the true PDs. Informa-
tion uncertainty is measured as the coeﬃcient of variation of the 12-months
ahead I/B/E/S earnings forecasts.19
Unfortunately, a direct adjustment of the PD estimates is not possible. Instead
an indirect approch is necessary. In the ﬁrst step, the impact of these parameters
(together with the EDF) on CDS spreads is measured for each maturity τ via a
regression, i.e.20
ln(CDSspreadτ)=β0+β1ln(EDFτ)+β2ln(IV)+β3SKEW+β4ln(UNCERT)+ .
In a second step the CDS-spread for the ’During Crisis’ subperiod are adjusted
based on the assumption, that IV, SKEW and UNCERT would take average
values of the ’Before Crisis’ subperiod. Based on these adjusted (lower) CDS
spreads, the adjusted 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year Sharpe ratio estimates were deter-
mined. It should be noted that this is a very conservative robustness test: Some
of these parameters may (and are likely to) be positively correlated with risk
aversion. Subtracting the part of the CDS spread which is due to the high level
of these parameters during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis then also leads to a sub-
straction of a ’risk premium part’ and not only to a substraction of the ’PD part’.
Indeed, the results from the regression are as expected: Especially IV and
UNCERT have an economically signiﬁcant impact on CDS spreads, cf. table
4. In addition, the inﬂuence is larger for shorter CDS maturities. The eﬀects
are qualitatively the same for Europe and the U.S. although they are more pro-
nounced for the U.S. Adjusting the CDS spreads based on these regression re-
sults yields lower Sharpe ratio estimates with a slightly smaller downward sloping
19The coeﬃcient of variation for I/B/E/S forecasts for the next ﬁscal year end and the year
after the next ﬁscal year end is interpolated in order to receive a constant maturity 12-month
ahead coeﬃcient of variation.
20Berndt et.al. (2005) use a similar regression of CDS spreads on EDFs. They also show that
a log/log formulation performs better than a linear regression.33
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This table depicts the results of the regression ln(CDS − spreadτ)=β0 + β1ln(EDFτ)+
β2ln(IV)+β3SKEW +β4ln(UNCERT)+ . ln(EDF) denotes the logarithm of the expected
default frequency for the respective maturity, ln(IV) denotes the logarithm of the short-term
option implied volatility, SKEW denotes the 180-days historical skewness in equity returns,
ln(UNCERT) denotes the 12-months ahead coeﬃcient of variation of the I/B/E/S earnings
forecasts. T-statistics are in paranthesis.
Panel A: Europe Panel B: US
Maturity Maturity
357 1 0 357 1 0
ln(EDF) 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19
(17.44) (19.62) (20.55) (21.11) (14.37) (15.83) (16.06) (15.68)
ln(IV) 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.89 0.81 0.76 0.69
(14.97) (15.46) (15.41) (15.87) (23.77) (24.08) (24.03) (23.05)
SKEW 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(4.60) (4.41) (4.77) (4.99) (-5.49) (-5.17) (-5.05) (-5.14)
ln(UNCERT) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.16
(5.38) (4.76) (4.66) (4.71) (19.06) (17.84) (17.69) (17.54)
trend. However, the general statement of an inverse term structure of risk premia
during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis does not change based on the adjusted CDS
spreads (cf. ﬁgure 6).
5.5 Liquidity, Market microstructure eﬀects
In contrast to bonds, CDS are unfunded exposures without ﬁxed supply and
without large upfront payments. Both theoretical considerations as well as em-
pirical studies indicate that liquidity has only a minor eﬀect on CDS spreads
(Longstaﬀ et.al. (2005), Ericsson et al. (2006) and B¨ uhler/Trapp (2008)). How-
ever, in an OTC market like the CDS market, market microstructure liquidity
eﬀects may drive valuations either below or beyond the ’fair’ market values due
to supply/demand eﬀects. These eﬀects may be especially preeminant in turmoil
periods such as the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis.34
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Figure 6: Term structure of risk premia before (04/2004-06/2007) and during
(07/2007-03/2009) the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis for Europe (index: iTraxx Eu-
rope) and the U.S. (index: CDX.NA.IG) before and after adjustments as de-
scribed in table 4. x-axis: maturity, y-axis: CDS-implied market Sharpe ratio
based on (11).
This study uses two measures to capture the potential eﬀect of market mi-
crostructure liquidity eﬀects: First, the bid/ask spread. Second, the veracity
score as provided by CMA. The veracity score is a trade indicator. A veracity
score of ’1’ denotes that a trade has taken place, a veracity score of ’2’ denotes
a ﬁrm quote, lower veracity scores indicate even lower liquidity, e.g. indicative
quotes or bond-derived CDS spreads. Figure 7 plots these measures for all matu-
rities for both the ’Before crisis’ and ’During crisis’ subperiod. As expected, both
liquidity measures indicate that the 5-year maturity is the most liquid one (lowest
bid/ask spread, lowest average veracity score). If market microstructure eﬀects
dominate our results we would expect U-shaped CDS-implied risk premia which
are lowest for the most liquid - 5-year - maturity. In addition, there are even
signs that trades during turmoil periods tend to concentrate in the most liquid
maturity, i.e. 5-year CDS. Again, this result indicates that market microstructure
eﬀects are not the cause for the downward sloping risk premium curve.35
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Figure 7: Liquidity proxies for Europe (index: iTraxx Europe) and the U.S.
(index: CDX.NA.IG) based on 3-/5-/7- and 10-year CDS spreads from 04/2004-
03/2009. Solid lines: ’Before crisis’-period, Dotted lines: ’During crisis’-period.
Black lines: Bid/Ask spread, red lines: Trade indicator based on CMA’s veracity
score.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the term structure of risk premia before and during the
2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The analysis was based on a new approach proposed
by Berg/Kaserer (2009). We show that the term structure of risk premia was ﬂat
before the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis and inverse during the crisis. These results
are probably not surprising given the sentiment of market participants during the
ﬁnancial turmoil. However, the approach is - to our best knowledge - the ﬁrst
approach which is suited to monitor such a behavior of risk premia for diﬀerent
time horizons. Indeed, the standard errors of our estimates are small enough to
see a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in risk premium term structures before and during the
2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
Certainly, the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis is an unprecedented event in history.
Therefore, quantitative research in such a period will always have its limits. It is
possible that quantitative measures alone are not able to capture the dynamics36
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of certain parameters. E.g. market participants may have a ’gut feeling’ about
future default probabilities that are neither captured by agencies ratings nor by
any quantitative procedure. This paper analyzes alternative sources for the main
input parameters and tries to control for the parameters that can most reason-
ably be linked to the ’abnormal’ situation during the crisis (implied volatility,
skewness, information uncertainty). Of course, in these turbulent times room for
misinterpretation remains. However, based on all evidence available, the main
statements are quite robust. It would take extraordinary adjustments for any of
the input parameters to come up with a risk premium term structure which is
not inverse during the 2007/2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore we are conﬁdent that
the main results correctly mirror the situation during the ﬁnancial turmoil.
The resulting slope of the risk premium term structure may be useful for sev-
eral applications: First, practitioners might use it as a simple turmoil indicator.
E.g. if the slope is a lot smaller than zero there are two possible interpretations:
Either standard methodology to estimate default probabilities or correlations does
not work or short-term risk premia are indeed far above long-run levels. Both
interpretations are likely to indicate a turmoil situation. This turmoil indicator
may also be useful to assess if and when a turmoil has ended. Second, it can
be used in asset allocation decisions as well as for asset pricing applications (e.g.
company valuation).37
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A Estimating Sharpe ratios from CDS Spreads
A.1 Merton framework
This section brieﬂy reviews the procedure to estimate Sharpe ratios from CDS
spreads. It is mainly based on the (theoretical) results from Berg/Kaserer (2009).
The asset value Vt is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion with volatility
σ and drift μ = μV (actual drift) and r (risk-neutral drift) respectively, i.e.
dV P
t = μVtdt + σVtdBP
t and dV
Q
t = rVtdt + σVtdB
Q
t , where Bt denotes a stan-
dard Wiener process. The company’s debt consists of a single zero-bond and
default occurs if the asset value of the company falls below the nominal value N
of the zero bond at maturity of the bond.
In this framework, the real world default probability PDP(t,τ) between t and












Here, Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. The de-






















Using the CAPM relationship between the Sharpe ratio of the company’s
assets (SRV), the market Sharpe ratio (SRM) and the correlation between asset38
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returns and market returns (ρV,M)
SRV = SRM · ρV,M
yields an estimator for the market Sharpe ratio:







An interesting feature of this estimator is its robustness with respect to model
changes. The estimator uses the diﬀerence between (the inverse of the cumula-
tive normal distribution of the) risk-neutral and actual default probability. This
diﬀerence is barely eﬀected by the choice of the speciﬁc structural model of de-
fault. Huang/Huang (2003) have ﬁrst demonstrated this robustness based on
diﬀerent models, including a model with jumps in the asset value process and a
time-varying equity premium. Berg/Kaserer (2009) analyze a ﬁrst-passage time
framework and a model with unobservable asset values based on Duﬃe/Lando
(2001) to show this robustness.
A.2 Time-varying risk premia
If Sharpe ratios are time-varying then the derivation of the Merton framework
does not hold anymore. However, it can be shown that the formula from the
Merton framework still approximates the average expected Sharpe ratio if Sharpe
ratios follow a mean-reverting process (e.g. CIR process) with reasonable param-
eters. For ease of notation σV = σ, ρV,M = ρ and W V
t = Wt is used. The real
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≈ Va r(σWτ) (22)
is used to substitute the integral by its expected value EP




proximation is justiﬁed since θs is mean-reverting and the volatility of ρσ
  t+τ
t θsds
is ’a lot’ smaller than the volatility of σWτ. In addition, the covariance term will
usually be negative if it is assumed that negative equity returns go hand in hand
with an increase in risk aversion.






















The same result was shown by Huang/Huang (2003) based on a speciﬁc cali-
bration of a mean-reverting model.40
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B Details on the estimation of CDS-implied Sharpe
ratios
Table 5 provides details on the Sharpe ratio estimation from CDS spreads. For
a detailled discussion of the general characteristics and a comparison to other
Sharpe ratio estimates we refer to an in-depth analysis in Berg/Kaserer (2009).
It should, however, be noted that the average Sharpe ratio of 30-50% before the
crisis is slightly lower than comparable historical equity premium estimates and
slightly higher than equity-implied Sharpe ratio estimates, the cross-sectional
variation is also in line with results from other studies.21
Figure 8 provides a time-series plot of the 25th and 75th-percentile of the
5-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratios. It should be noted, that we have assumed a
ﬁxed recovery rate which is not dependent on the industry sector or other ﬁrm
characteristics. Although the literature on recovery estimates is still evolving,
there is signiﬁcant evidence of cross-sectional variation in recovery rates between
diﬀerent industry sectors, cf. Fitch (2005). Our estimator is convex in the re-
covery rate, but the convexity is not very pronounced. Therefore, the average
Sharpe ratio estimate should not be signiﬁcantly biased. However, some part of
the cross-sectional variation of our Sharpe ratio estimates is likely due to this
constant recovery rate assumption and we expect a smaller variation if industry-
speciﬁc recovery rates are applied.22
Finally, we report the results for the term structure of risk premia separately
for ﬁnancials and non-ﬁnancials. The results are shown in ﬁgure 9. It can be
seen that - for both the U.S. as well as Europe - the resulting slope of the risk
premium term structure is similar for ﬁnancials and non-ﬁnancials.
21Cf. e.g. Claus/Thomas (2001), Fama/French (2002) and Dimson et al. (2006) for com-
parisons with historical Sharpe ratios/equity premia and Gebhardt et al. (2001), Fama/French
(2002) and Botosan/Plumlee (2005) for equity-implied Sharpe ratios/equity premia.
22In case that this methodology is applied to analyze cross-sectional variations in the cost of
capital we see a more sophisticated modeling of the cross-sectional variations in the recovery
rate as one of the key challenges.41
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Figure 8: 25th and 75th percentile of CDS-implied Sharpe ratios based on 5-year
CDS spreads and EDFs. Picture on left-hand side: Europe, picture on right-hand
side: U.S. Solid line: Median estimate, dotted lines: 25th and 75th percentile.
Figure 9: Slope of risk premium term structure measured as 10-year CDS-implied
Sharpe ratio minus 3-year CDS-implied Sharpe ratio for ﬁnancials and non-
ﬁnancial companies. Picture on left-hand side: U.S., picture on right-hand side:
Europe. Solid line: Estimate based on ﬁnancial companies, dotted line: Estimates
based on non-ﬁnancial companies.43
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